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Can an Equitable Interest Held in Trust
Be Transferred Wrongfully by the
Trustee Free of the Trust?
ELLSWORTH WILTSHIRE
We all know that a bona fide purchaser for value of trust
property holds the same free of the trust. But it is usually
stated that such a purchaser must obtain the legal title to the
property to so eliminate the trust beneficiary. However, sup-
pose the trustee holds the equitable (but not the legal) title
to property in trust for a beneficiary. Is the interest of such
beneficiary in the property cut off in Virginia should the
trustee wrongfully convey such equitable title to a bona fide
purchaser for value?
The importance of the problem is indicated by three typical
cases:
Case A. A mortgages land to X to secure a loan of $10,000.
Later A conveys the land to T upon an oral trust from B.
Thereafter T wrongfully conveys the land to C for $15,000
cash. C pays the cash and receives conveyance of the land
from T without notice of the oral trust. Does C hold the land
free of the trust for B? (Whenever the word "mortgage" is
used in this article, it will include not only the transfer of land
by a mortgagor to a mortgagee as security for the perform-
ance of an obligation owing to the latter but also the transfer
of land by a grantor to a trustee in trust to secure the per-
formance of an obligation owing to a third party.)
Case B. Through fraud B is induced to convey land to T.
Thus T holds the property in constructive trust for B. Later
T mortgages the land to X to secure a loan of $10,000, X hav-
ing no notice of the trust. Thereafter T conveys the land to C
for $15,000 cash. C pays the cash and receives the conveyance
without notice of the fraud. Does C hold the land free of the
constructive trust for B?
Case C. A, the owner of a bond for $10,000, transfers the
same to T in trust for X. Thereafter X declares himself trus-
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tee for B of his equitable interest in the bond. Later X sells
and assigns his interest as beneficiary under the first trust to
C. C pays the purchase price and receives the assignment
without notice of the trust for B. Is B 's interest in the bond
thereby cut off?
In Case A and also in Case B, T under the orthodox view
has, only the equity of redemption in the land in trust for B.
The trust is an express trust in Case A and a constructive
trust in Case B. The mortgage given to secure the loan trans-
fers the legal title to X, so that T has only the equity of re-
demption or equitable title as the trust res. In each case C,
who obtains conveyance from T and pays value without no-
tice, claims he is a bona fide purchaser for value and thus is
ahead of B. However, B maintains that C received the equit-
able (but not the legal) title to the realty and accordingly
takes subject to the trust for B.
In Case C, X has only equitable title to the bond when he
declares himself trustee of his interest for B. The declaration
of trust is not equivalent to an assignment by X of his interest
in the bond to B, for X still remains in the scheme. X is now
trustee of the equitable title for B, and T, who as trustee holds
the legal title to the bond, cannot ignore X as trustee of the
equitable interest therein. Later, when C purchases for value
from X, C ostensibly receives by the transfer the equitable
interest which X had before X had declared himself trustee
for B. C of course claims he is a bona fide purchaser for value
and hence is ahead of B. B, however, insists that C at the most
only received an equitable title or interest, that B's equity is
prior in time to that of C, and that accordingly B should
prevail.
Courts and legal writers frequently state that the doctrine
of bona fide purchaser for value can be invoked only when the
purchaser receives the legal title to the property. They main-
tain that where each of the claimants has only an equity, the
one prior in time should prevail. Indeed, as is said in Briscoe
v. Ashby, 24 Gratt. 454 (1874), discussed hereinafter in detail:
"Now every equitable title is incomplete on its face. It is in
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truth nothing more than a title to go into chancery to have the
legal estate conveyed, and therefore every purchaser of a
mere equity takes it subject to every clog that may lie on it,
whether he had notice or not."
The English cases uphold the proposition that, when an
equitable interest is held under an express trust or subject to
a constructive trust, the purchaser thereof for value without
notice of the trust holds subject to the trust. Bogert, The Law
of Trusts and Trustees, Section 885. Thus, in Cave v. Cave,
15 Ch. D. 639 (1880), a trustee wrongfully used trust money
to purchase land and the legal title was conveyed to him.
Later, he mortgaged the land to A, then mortgaged the same
to B, and finally mortgaged it to C, each of whom had no
notice of the trust. The court held that A, having obtained the
legal title, took free of the trust but that the beneficiaries of
the trust were ahead of B and C, as each of them received
only an equitable interest.
Some American cases have held the same view adopted by
the English authorities. However, several American cases
have permitted the bona fide purchaser for value of an equit-
able interest to prevail. Thus, in Loring v. Goodhue, 259 Mass.
495, 156 N.E. 704 (1927) a business trust had the beneficial in-
terest therein evidenced by certificates. The owner of one of
these certificates transferred it to a dealer to have a new
certificate issued therefor. The latter had the new certificate
issued in his own name and then wrongfully pledged the new
certificate to secure a loan. The lender had no notice that his
debtor was not the beneficial owner. It was held that the
pledgee was ahead o the original certificate holder.
The Restatement of Trusts, Section 285 (1935) states the
rule that, if the trustee conveys trust property in breach of
trust to a bona fide purchaser for value, the purchaser holds
the same free of the trust and is under no liability to the bene-
ficiary; although the trust property is an equitable interest. In
Comment a to that section it is said: "The policy which pro-
tects a bona fide purchaser of land, chattels, and choses in
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action is applicable also where the trust property is an equit-
able interest."
The basis for applying the doctrine to the transfer of an
equitable interest is given in Scott on Trusts, p. 2162 (2d ed.
1956) as follows:
In spite of these decisions and in spite of the numerous
dicta to the effect that the doctrine of purchase for value
is applicable only where the purchaser acquires a legal
interest in the property, there would seem to be good
reason for holding that a purchaser of an equitable in-
terest, if he pays value and has no notice that the equi-
table interest was held in trust, should take free and clear
of the trust. It would seem that the same policy which
permits the purchaser of land or chattels or choses in
action to keep the property so purchased is applicable to
equitable interests. The problem in each case is one of
weighing the interest in the security of transactions
against the interest in the security of property already
acquired. The tendency of the law has been more and
more to protect persons who in good faith enter into
business transactions rather than those who simply seek
to retain what they already have. If it is a sound policy,
and not a mere matter of technique, which underlies the
protection given to purchasers of trust property who pay
value and have no notice that the trustee is committing a
breach of trust, it would seem that the same protection
should be given to purchasers of equitable interests, If
the beneficiaries of a trust must bear the risk that the
trustee may prove recreant to the trust by transferring
the trust property to a bona fide purchaser, why should
they not bear the risk whether the trust property happens
to be a legal or an equitable interest? The real question is
whether equitable interests, like legal interests, are not
such usual subjects of commerce that commercial trans-
actions with respect to them deserve protection. If they
are. the doctrine of bona fide purchase should apply to
such interests. It would seem clear that it should apply to
such an interest as that which is held by the owner of land
which is subject to a mortgage. Even though under the
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orthodox common-law theory the owner of land subject to
a mortgage is held to have only an equitable interest, an
equity of redemption, it would seem clear that if the
owner held the interest upon a secret trust, a bona fide
purchaser should take the land free of the trust although
subject to the mortgage. It would seem even more clear
that if the owner of land subject to a mortgage is induced
by fraud to sell the land, a bona fide purchaser from the
fraudulent vendee should take the land free of the con-
structive trust upon which his vendor held it as a result
of the fraud. * * * Of course, in many American states it
is held that a mortgage does not give the mortgagee legal
title to the land but only a legal lien upon the land, and
that the mortgagor is the owner of the land, holding the
legal title to it subject to the mortgage, and has not
merely an equitable interest. In such states of course
where land which is subject to a mortgage is held in trust,
a bona fide purchaser of the land acquires the legal title
to the land and is protected.
Where does Virginia stand on this question? In considering
the attitude of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, it is
advisable to discuss the competing rights of the bona fide pur-
chaser and the trust beneficiary in two separate situations:
(1) When the trustee wrongfully conveys to the purchaser
what would have been the legal title to the trust property but
for the possible effect of an outstanding mortgage and (2)
When the trustee holds only an equitable interest (not made
so by the effect of an outstanding mortgage) in the trust prop-
erty and wrongfully conveys such interest to the purchaser.
(1) When the property transferred is
subject to an earlier mortgage.
The property transferred wrongfully by the trustee to a
bona fide purchaser may be subject to an earlier mortgage.
As in Case A, such mortgage may have been placed upon the
property before the trust was created. As in Case B, such
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mortgage may have been placed upon the property by the
trustee himself.
Whether the purchaser seeking to hold the property free
of the trust gets legal or equitable title depends upon whether
with respect to mortgages Virginia has adopted the "title"
theory or the "lien" theory. Scott on Trusts, p. 2163 (2nd ed.
1956) quoted earlier herein. In a "title" state, the mortgagee
has the legal title, the trustee has merely an equitable title
(equity of redemption), the trustee conveys only equitable
title to the purchaser, and the latter in many jurisdictions
takes subject to the trust. However, in a "lien" state, the
trustee has legal title, the mortgagee merely has a legal lien,
the trustee conveys legal title to the purchaser, and the latter
accordingly taks free of the trust. Glenn on Mortgages p. 209
(1943).
Prior to Gravatt v. Lane, 121 Va. 44, (1917), Virginia ad-
hered to the "title" theory. The mortgagee was deemed "en-
titled to an estate as tenant in fee or for a term for years, as
the case may be.... as regards title, subject to an agreement
as to the possession and defeasible at law, by the performance
of the condition." Favlkner v. Brockenbrough, 4 Rand. 245 at
248 (1826).
In the Gravatt case, one. question was whether the owner of
the land, upon which there was an unsatisfied mortgage, could
maintain the action of ejectment in his own name against a
third party. Clearly under the "title" theory of mortgages,
the owner could not. Ejectment could only be brought in the
name of the holder of the legal title, and the legal title was
actually in the mortgagee. However, the court held that the
owner could maintain the action in his own name notwith-
standing the existence of the unsatisfied mortgage. In so do-
ing, the court has appeared to adopt the "lien" theory of
mortgages. This is shown from the following portion of the
opinion by Prentis, J.:
The great weight of authority, however, is that an out-
standing unsatisfied mortgage or deed of trust on land to
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secure a debt is regarded as a mere lien, and that the mort-
gagor or grantor may still maintain ejectment in his own
name, and the defendant will not be permitted to set up
the outstanding mortgage or deed of trust to defeat the
action.
We perceive no sufficient reason on principle for a
different rule, even though the debt has not been satisfied.
While technically the legal title is in the trustee, it is
only vested in him for a definite purpose, namely, to se-
cure the debt. Such a deed should be construed iu actions
of ejectment as a mere lien upon the property. This view
is in accord with reason and the greater weight of au-
thority and has the approval of this court.
The court made no reference to Faulkner v. Brockenbrough,
supra, or other Virginia cases espousing the "title" theory.
The only Virginia authorities it relied on held that the mort-
gagor of a satisfied mortgage could maintain ejectment in his
own name. But these cases were firmly based on a Virginia
statute (now Va. Code Ann. §8-817 (1950), which is in no way
applicable to unsatisfied mortgages.
It would therefore appear that the Gravatt case has unmis-
takably placed Virginia among the "lien" states. Dean W. M.
Lile in 8 Va. Law Rev. 224 (1924) reluctantly states Virginia
has by that case adopted the "lien" theory "inadvertently
as is believed". See also The Nature of a Mortgage in Vir-
ginia in 14 Va. Law Rev. 235 (1927).
One year before the Gravatt case, a rather similar situation
was presented in Murphy's Hotel v. Benet, 119 Va. 157 (1916).
There A mortgaged land to B and later mortgaged it to C.
Each mortgage was duly recorded when given. Before the
first mortgage was given, X obtained a judgment against A,
but the judgment was never docketed and neither B nor C had
notice thereof when their respective mortgages arose. X
claimed his undocketed judgment was ahead of C's mortgage
upon the basis that the legal title to the land was in B and that
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accordingly C's mortgage merely gave him an equity. The
court held the second mortgage was superior to the un-
docketed judgment.
If Virginia was then a "lien" state, this holding was ob-
viously correct. B under the mortgage received not the legal
title but only a legal lien superior to the undocketed judgment.
Likewise, C under the second mortgage obtained a legal lien
superior to the same judgment. However, the court failed to
discuss either the "lien" theory or the "title" theory. It ap-
parently took the position that C was a "purchaser thereof
for valuable consideration without notice" under what is now
Section 8-390 of the ('ode of 1950 and that hence as to it the
judgment was not a lien until and except from the time the
judgment was duly docketed. The Court failed to mention in
its opinion whether such a "purchaser" must have legal title
or could prevail only with equitable title. It is interesting to
note that the Murphy's Hotel case has not been cited in any
later case.
Since the Gravatt case, only one case has been found that
might involve whether Virginia is now a "lien" state or is
still a "title" state. In University of Richmond v. Stone, 148
Va. 686, (1927), the owner of land conveyed it upon a mort-
gage to secure a note, which note provided for the payment
of attorney's fees in event of default. The mortgage, however,
was silent as to attorney's fees. Later the owner conveyed the
land to a purchaser subject to the mortgage. Thereafter the
question arose of whether the payment of such attorney's fees
was secured under the lien of the mortgage, so far as the pur-
chaser was concerned. The court held the lien under the mort-
gage for the attorney's fees was. valid as against the pur-
chaser on two grounds: (1) the purchaser took with notice
of the provisions of the note and (2) the purchaser acquired
only the equity of the grantor and hence received no better
title than the grantor had, citing Briscoe v. Ashby, 24 Gratt
454 (1874), and Wasserman v. Metzger, 105 Va. 744 (1906),
hereinafter discussed. The major portion of the opinion was
devoted to a detailed consideration of the ground that the
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purchaser took with notice of the provision in the note as to
attorney's fees and was hence not bona fide. Neither the
Gravatt case nor the lien theory was even mentioned in the
court's opinion. Since the ground of taking with notice was
considered so much more elaborately than the ground of tak-
ing only the equity of the seller, it is not believed that the
Stone case should be deemed to overrule the Gravatt case and
to toss Virginia back among the "title" states.
We may therefore conclude that, when the property con-
veyed by a trustee in breach of trust to a purchaser is subject
to a mortgage, the doctrine in Virginia is that the purchaser
receiving the conveyance and paying value without notice of
the rights of the beneficiary takes free of the trust. Hence, in
Virginia in Case A and Case B the purchaser would hold the
property free of the trust.
(2) Where the trust property conveyed by the trustee
to the purchaser is merely an equitable interest (not so
made by a mortgage).
This leaves for consideration the situation, such as Case C
stated above, where no mortgage is involved, the trustee has
only an equitable interest in trust, and he wrongfully trans-
fers the equitable interest to a bona fide purchaser for value.
There both the beneficiary of the trust and the purchaser have
"equities" or "equitable interests". Does the beneficiary,
who of course has the prior equity, prevail in Virginia? Or
does the purchaser with only equitable title take free of the
trust?
The leading case is Briscoe v. Ashby, 24 Gratt. 454 (1874).
There a trustee purchased land at a court sale and paid the
cash portion of the purchase price with trust funds. The Court
retained the legal title until the balance of the purchase price
was paid. While the legal title was so withheld from him, the
trustee conveyed the land to a purchaser, who paid cash and
received the conveyance without notice of the trust. It was
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held that the purchaser took subject to the trust. The court
in its opinion stated in part as follows:
The reason of the distinction between the purchaser of a
legal and equitable interest seems to be that the protec-
tion accorded to bona fide purchasers is a departure from
the general rule of jurisprudence, which holds that no
man can transfer a greater right than he possesses, and
regards the vendee as standing in the same position as
the vendor under whom he claims. This exception was
made by equity against the rights and remedies which it
bad called into being, and in favor of purchasers who
bought in good faith, and under the impression that they
were acquiring a good legal title. But when the purchase
is a mere equity which owes its existence to a court of
chancery, and cannot be enforced without its assistance,
the reasons from departing from the general maxim ...
is at an end, and the right acquired by the vendee is
necessarily limited to that of the vendor. When, therefore,
a purchaser buys an equitable estate or interest with a
knowledge of its real character and without obtaining a
legal title, he can found no claim on the mere fact of the
purchase, and must stand or fall by the title of the vendor.
Thus, the Briscoe case clearly holds that the purchaser of
an equitable estate from a trustee takes subject to a trust of
which he has no notice.
This case was followed by three cases, all of which involved
mortgages. In the first, Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 91
Va. 42 (1895), a wife claimed her husband had unbeknown to
her purchased land in his own name but with her money. He
thereafter conveyed the land successively in three separate
mortgages. The wife claimed her husband held the land in
constructive trust for her and that her interest was superior
to all three mortgages. The court held that, even if it be true
that neither the trustee nor the beneficiaries of the mortgages
had notice of the wife's claim and therefore were bona fide
purchasers for value, the evidence on behalf of the wife failed
to establish a resulting trust in her favor when her husband
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purchased the property. The indication that the second and
third mortgages would be superior to the beneficiary of a
resulting trust is at best a weak dictum. The Briscoe case
was not even mentioned, and it is clear that the court rested
its holding primarily upon the fact that the wife had not
proved a resulting trust in the first instance.
The doctrine of the Briscoe case was followed in Evans
Bros. v. Roanoke Savings Bank, 95 Va. 294 (1879), and again
in Wasserman v. Metzger, 105 Va. 744 (1906). However, in
both of these cases the trustee was held to have conveyed
merely an equitable estate because of an earlier mortgage.
Since Virginia is now committed to the "lien" theory of
mortgages through the Gravatt case, it would appear that the
purchaser would, if each case were before the court today,
take free of the trust. However, these two cases do show
clearly the adherence of the court to the position that, if a
trustee has only the equitable title, he cannot convey such in-
terest to a bona fide purchaser so as to cut off the trust.
We have found no later Virginia cases bearing upon the
question.
Summary
The situation in Virginia may be summarized as follows:
1. As Virginia is now a "lien" state, when the trustee
has the legal title to property in trust subject to the lien of a
mortgage, a bona fide purchaser for value from him subject to
or assuming the mortgage will hold the property free of the
trust. This of course eliminates a vital danger which would
otherwise exist when land is sold and the purchaser takes
subject to or assumes an existing mortgage. The purchaser,
or the title insurance company if it insures the title of the
purchaser, need have no fear that perhaps the seller holds
the property upon an express or constructive or resulting
trust of which the purchaser has no notice.
2. But, if the trustee has only equitable title to prop-
erty and holds the same upon an express trust or has obtained
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such title through fraud, duress, undue influence, or breach
of confidential relationship or has purchased such title with
the money of another or holds it subject to some other equity,
a bona fide purchaser of such equitable title from him would,
it appears, take subject to the trust. However, the leading
case was decided eighty-five years ago, and the later cases
have been mortgage cases handed down before Virginia
adopted the "lien" theory of mortgages. In recent years the
Restatement of Trusts, authorities such as Professor Scott,
and some courts of last resort in this country have taken the
view that in such a situation the purchaser should take free of
the trust. Our Supreme Court of Appeals, which has hereto-
fore discarded the "title" theory of mortgages for the more
modern "lien" theory, may well, when presented squarely
with the problem, favor the interest in the security of trans-
actions over the interest in the security of acquisitions in this
situation to the extent of allowing the bona fide purchaser for
value of an equitable title from a trustee to hold the same free
of the trust.
